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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SHARLEEN M. McREYNOLDS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

Case No. 890172-CA

vs.
Category No. 14b

GLENN L. MCREYNOLDS,
Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

This is an appeal from an Order and Judgment and from
post-trial rulings following a trial to the bench concerning
delinquent child support.

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant

to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h) (Supp. 1988).

ISSUE PRESENTED

Did the trial court err in failing to award judgment for
the unpaid amount of child support owed by the defendant?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings.

This

is an action upon plaintiff's petition filed August 4, 1986, to

recover unpaid child support from the defendant, who is the exhusband of plaintiff.

In addition, plaintiff sought a modifica-

tion of the divorce decree to increase the amount of child
support payments and to enforce other provisions of the divorce
decree.

(R. 55.)

In a bench trial, the trial Court found a substantial
change

of

support.

circumstances
(R. 284-85.)

and

ordered

an

increase

in

child

The Court adopted a Stipulation by the

parties of unpaid child support through July, 1986, and awarded
judgment in that amount.

The Court also determined the amount

of unpaid child support from August, 1986, through May, 1988, to
be

$3,520.00, but

amount.

then

(R. 283-84.)

refused

to

award

judgment

for that

Plaintiff then filed a Motion For a New

Trial or Amendment of Judgment on November 7, 1988 (R. 298),
which motion was denied by the Court's Ruling of February 21,
1989

(R. 326).

Plaintiff thereafter perfected

which goes only to the issue of judgment

this appeal,

for unpaid child

support from August, 1986, through May, 1988.
B.

Statement of Facts.

The plaintiff and defendant in

this case were divorced on March 7, 1984 pursuant to a decree
entered in Evans ton, Wyoming.

(R. 28.)

On June 29, 1984 an

Order and Judgment was entered in Davis County, Utah, pertaining
to those matters not adjudicated by the Wyoming decree.
54.)

(R. 52-

Those matters included the care, custody and control of

the minor children of the parties, visitation for the defendant,

2

child support, alimony, debts and a division of marital property.

(R. 52-54 0
From the date of the entry of the original child support

order on June 29, 1984, until the date of plaintifffs petition
for a judgment for delinquent child support on August 4, 1986,
defendant paid plaintiff no child support whatsoever.
347.)

(R. 346-

After plaintiff filed her petition, defendant made a

partial

payment

toward

delinquent

child

support,

leaving

a

support delinquency in the amount of $1,120.00 through July,
1986.

(R. 241-242, 445-446.)
Prior

to the

trial

below,

the

trial

court

entered

a

pretrial order establishing the amount of unpaid child support
through July, 1986, in the amount of $1,120.00.
order specified

This pretrial

all issues to be tried and contempt

plaintiff was not listed as an issue.

(R. 241-243.)

of the

On May 18,

1988, the Court heard testimony concerning the issues set forth
in the Pretrial

Order, including the amount of unpaid child

support for the period of August 19, 1986, through May, 1988.
(R. 242.)

After hearing the evidence, the Court adopted the

Stipulation of the parties relating to the amount of unpaid
child

support

through

July

of

1986,

and

incorporated

following findings into its Order and Judgment:
2.
The Court concludes that the
amount to which the plaintiff would
otherwise be entitled for child support
accruing from August, 1986 through the
end of May, 1988, is the sum of
$3,520.00.
(R. 284, para. 2; Addendum.)
3

the

The trial court then refused to award judgment for the
above-determined amount of unpaid child support based upon the
following additional findings:
3.
The Court concludes that the
plaintiff and her current husband have
purposefully intimidated the defendant
and frustrated his attempts to visit
with his children by repeatedly changing
their address and telephone numbers,
forcing calls about the children through
plaintiff's present husband and a law
firm answering and forwarding facility,
and have not cooperated in meeting
scheduled telephone calls from defendant
and the children as ordered by Domestic
Relations Commissioner, all of which
have
caused
defendant
considerable
anxiety, expenditure of time and expense
which
could have been avoided by
reasonable efforts on the part of
plaintiff and her husband to afford him
his visitation rights.
4.
In that regard, the Court concludes that the claims of the defendant
are substantially true as it related to
his frustrated visitation with his minor
children over a period of time from July
of 1986 to the present time. The Court,
therefore, concludes that the accrued
support for the period between July and
the present time as found in the sum of
$3,520.00 cannot, in good conscience, be
allowed the plaintiff because of the
conduct of the parties in which she has
been principally responsible in denying
the
rights
of
visitation
to
the
defendant.
(R. 284, para. 3 and 4; Addendum.)
The plaintiff made a motion for a new trial or for an
amendment of the judgment based principally upon the case of
Race v. Race, 740 P.2d 253 (Utah 1987), and a line of prior Utah
cases which have held that denial of visitation may not be used
4

as a means of eliminating a child support obligation.
295, 298.)

(R. 289-

The trial court denied the plaintiff's motion and

refused to amend the order and judgment.

(R. 326.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The compelling

public policy

concern

of

insuring that

children are properly supported by those having responsibility
for them

is reflected

in the Utah Supreme Court's

declaration that child support
payment

of

support

visitation.

may

not

emphatic

is the right of a child and

be

conditioned

upon

issues

of

Enactments of the Utah Legislature and a series of

Utah Supreme Court cases reinforce the important public policy
that child support is a possessory right of a child quite apart
from issues relating to the conduct of the divorced parents.
Since child support payments are an entitlement of the child,
they are to be insulated from intrusion, including visitation
right disputations, no matter how egregious the conduct of a
parent may be.

Utah does not stand alone in this position.

fact, the majority

of jurisdictions

In

are in accord with the

position that a violation of visitation rights does not suspend
a non-custodial parent's support obligation.

Rather, a non-

custodial parent has remedies available through the courts to
enforce visitation rights without interfering with the welfare
of the child.

5

A few older Utah cases seem to suggest that a custodial
parent may be barred from trying to reimpose support obligations
on a non-custodial parent where the custodial parent voluntarily
assumes that obligation in exchange for consideration.

The Utah

Supreme Court has stated that the rationale underlying such
decisions is weak, and the circumstances under which such a
waiver or estoppel would come into play are rare.

Moreover,

these cases have been superceded by the more recent authority
recognizing the superior rights of the child to receive support.
The facts of the present case would not give rise to a claim of
waiver or estoppel.
For these reasons, the trial court erred in refusing to
award judgment for the unpaid child support.

The decision of

the trial court should be overturned and judgment for the unpaid
child support should be awarded to plaintiff.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT HAS DECLARED THAT CHILD SUPPORT
IS THE RIGHT OF A CHILD AND PAYMENT OF SUPPORT
MAY NOT BE CONDITIONED UPON ISSUES OF VISITATION.
A.
Even Extreme Conduct bv a Party in Denying Visitation of Minor Children Will Not Excuse Payment of
Support bv the Parent Denied Such Visitation.
Recently, the Supreme Court of Utah considered a situation
where the trial court conditioned payment of child support on
the development of a visitation schedule.

In overturning the

trial court on that issue the Supreme Court held:
6

Although the awarding of visitation and
child support is within the court's
discretion, the court must consider the
child's paramount right to and need for
his parents' support. Utah Code Ann. §§
78-45-3 and -4; Woodward v. Woodward,
709 P.2d 393 (Utah 1985). Court-ordered
child support is an obligation imposed
for the benefit of the children, not the
divorcing spouse.
Race v. Race, 740 P.2d 253, 256 (Utah 1987) (emphasis added).
In Race, the mother had been held in contempt by the trial
court for her refusal to allow the defendant to exercise his
visitation rights.

Even in the face of this contempt citation,

however, the Utah Supreme Court refused to allow child support
payments to be used as a method of coercing visitation.
demonstrates

the

strength

of

the

proposition

that

This

support

obligations are imposed for the benefit of the children and are
not to be tampered with based on the misconduct of a parent.
The policy reasons underlying the position of the Utah
Supreme Court are well founded and have been articulated by the
courts and the legislature for many years.
has emphatically

and unequivocally

shall support his child."

The Utah legislature

declared

that

"every man

Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-3

(1987).

That same year, the Utah Supreme Court held that a parent cannot
rid

himself

transfer

of his

it to

duty

another

of

support

individual

Gulley, 570 P.2d 127 (Utah 1977).

by

even

by

purporting

contract.

Gullev

to
v.

In earlier cases, the Utah

Supreme Court has declared that "the right of a child to support
is a paramount right which it possesses quite apart from any
consideration relating to the conduct of its divorced parents,"
7

Earl v. Earl, 17 Utah 2d 156, 406 P.2d 302, 303 (1965); "children are unconditionally entitled to support from their parents,"
Reeves v. Reeves, 556 P.2d 1267, 1268

(Utah 1976); and "[t]he

right to child support is a right of the children themselves,"
Hansen v. Gossett, 590 P.2d 1258, 1260 (Utah 1979).
The state has a compelling

interest to insure that the

rights of minors are fully enforced, particularly since minors
are

most

often

themselves.

without

Paramount

the
among

means
these

receive support from one's parents.

to

enforce

rights

is

those
the

rights

right

to

When that right of support

becomes a bargaining chip in a conflict between parents, then
the

rights

of the child

are trampled

upon

and

the child

is

victimized.
In 1987, the Utah legislature enacted a law making each
installment of child support a judgment.

The pertinent portions

of that enactment are as follows:
(1)
Each payment or installment of
child or spousal support under any child
support order, as defined by Subsection
78-45d-l(3) [now 62A-11-401(3)], is, on
and after the date it is due:
(a)
a judgment with the same
attributes and effect of any judgment of
a district court, except as provided in
Subsection (2);
(b)
entitled, as a judgment, to
full faith and credit in this and any
other jurisdiction; and
(c)
not subject to retroactive
modification
by
this
or
any
other
jurisdiction,
except
as provided
in
Subsection (2) .

8

(2)
A child or spousal support payment
under a child support order may be
modified with respect to any period
during which a petition for modification
is pending, but only from the date
notice of that petition was given to the
obligee, if the obligor is the petitioner, or to the obligor, if the obligee is
the petitioner.
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.6 (1987).
While the above statute does not cover the entire period
for which delinquent child support is sought in the present
case, it indicates the desire of the Utah legislature, which
reflects public policy, to preserve child support against any
interference.

The statute accomplishes this by giving to each

installment of child support the full force and effect of a
court judgment.
Another Utah

Supreme

Court

case which was

decided

in

identical fashion to Race, but was decided many years earlier,
is the case of McClure v. Powell, 15 Utah 2d 324, 392 P.2d 624
(1964).

In

that

case,

the

custodial

parent

(the

concealed herself and the children from the father.
court

found that the father

failed to provide

mother)

The trial

support only

because he could not locate his ex-wife and children.

Despite

the conduct of the custodial parent, the trial court and the
Utah Supreme Court held that the father was not relieved of his
support obligation, although principles of equity did relieve
him of the obligation to pay interest on the amounts which had
become due.

9

The courts and legislature of Utah have repeatedly and
forcefully articulated the policy that child support payments
are an entitlement of the child, not of the custodial parent,
and as such, are to be insulated
disputation

over

visitation

from

rights.

intrusion,

including

Plaintiff-appellant

respectfully submits that Race v. Race is controlling in the
present circumstances and that the trial court erred in failing
to award judgment for the $3,520.00 in unpaid child support.
B.

The Majority of Other Jurisdictions are in Accord
With the Utah Position on the Issue of Child
Support.

The Supreme Court of Colorado recently held:
Although
a
trial
court
has
the
discretion
to
consider
a
parent's
mistaken belief that child support is
conditioned on visitation rights as a
factual circumstance in deciding whether
a parent has failed without cause to
provide reasonable support, [citation
omitted], a violation of visitation
rights does not legally suspend the
obligation to support one's children.
County of Clearwater, Minn, v. Petrash,
198 Colo. 231, 598 P.2d 138 (1979);
Gruber v. Wallner, 198 Colo. 235, 598
P.2d 135 (1979).
Petition of R.H.N.. 710 P.2d 482, 488 (Colo. 1985) (en banc).
The

Supreme

Court

of

Oklahoma

overruled

an

earlier

Oklahoma Court of Appeals case which had excused child support
for the period that the mother had refused to allow the father's
visitation.

In so doing, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held:
Visitation is primarily for the benefit
of the child, and ordinarily a support
order must be paid even if the custodial
parent
wrongfully
denies
the
noncustodial parent's right to visitation.
10

The custodial parent's misconduct cannot
destroy the child's right to support,
nor may child support payments be used
as
a weapon
to
force
a
child's
visitation with a non-custodial parent.
The duty to support one's minor child is
a continuing obligation. Entitlement to
child support is not contingent upon
visitation rights.
Hester v. Hester,

663 P.2d

727, 729

added)

Irby v.

Irby,

(overruling

629

(Okla. 1983)
P. 2d

813

(emphasis

(Okla. App.

1981)).
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Wyoming recently reviewed
the weight

of authority

on the

issue of child

support and

concluded:
While many older cases hold to the
contrary, the modern view is that the
denial of visitation rights by the
custodial parent or the child does not
constitute a change in circumstances
which
justifies
the
reduction
or
termination of the noncustodial parent's
support obligation.
Brovles v. Brovles, 711 P.2d 1119, 1127 (Wyo. 1985).
Numerous other state courts have made similar rulings, a
sample of which includes the following:

Marie C. G. v. Guy L.,

133 Misc. 2d 291, 506 N.Y.S. 2d 547

(1986); State ex rel.

Southwell v. Chamberland, 361 N.W.2d 814 (Minn. 1985); Flynn v.
Flynn, 15 Ohio App. 3d 34, 472 N.E.2d 388 (1984); Coleman v.
Burnett, 169 Ga. App. 297, 312 S.E.2d 627 (1983); State ex rel.
Williams v. Williams, 647 S.W.2d 590 (Mo. App. 1983); and Appert
v. Appert, 80 N.C. App. 27, 341 S.E.2d 342 (1986).
The policy

rationale behind the above-cited

decisions,

which have declared the support obligation to be independent of
11

visitation rights, is identical to that stated in Utah decisions
and is simply that the welfare of the child is paramount.

This

is not to say, however, that the non-custodial parent whose
visitation rights have been impeded is left without remedy.
C.

A Non-custodial Parent has
Enforce Visitation Rights.

Proper

Remedies

to

When a custodial parent interferes with the visitation
rights of a non-custodial parent, the non-custodial parent may
initiate legal action to enforce compliance with the terms of
the custody decree.

The court may then use its contempt power

against the custodial parent to enforce visitation privileges.
The Oregon Court of Appeals contemplated this situation, and
declared:
Though the Court may use its contempt
power against the custodial parent to
enforce
visitation
privileges,
a
contempt citation might well be useless
where, as here, the children now refuse
to
see
the
non-custodial
parent—
either on their own volition or as a
result of the explicit or implicit
urging of the custodial parent. In any
event, the welfare of the children is
paramount.
The duty of a noncustodial
parent to support his or her children is
contingent only upon the needs of the
children and the ability of each of the
parents to provide support — and is not
dependent upon the opportunity of the
parent
to
exercise
visitation
privileges.
Matter of Marriage of Dooley, 30 Or. App. 989, 569 P.2d 627, 629
(1977) (emphasis added).
In the present case, respondent

failed to utilize the

proper methods available to him in the courts to remedy his
12

visitation problem.

Had he done so, and the proper remedy still

proved insufficient to resolve the problem, in such an extreme
circumstance further remedy might have been appropriate.

For

example, in Peterson v. Peterson, 530 P.2d 821 (Utah 1974), the
court "suspended" payment of support until the custodial parent
was purged of contempt.

The court in Peterson did not, however,

relieve the non-custodial parent of his support obligation.

A

remedy such as temporary suspension of payments is extreme and
should be imposed only under circumstances where the welfare of
the child would not be jeopardized.

The Peterson case turned on

the contempt issue, but in the present case defendant did not
use the procedures available to him and a contempt citation was
never issued.

If Peterson had turned simply on general prin-

ciples of equity, however, the Race decision, as more current
authority, would resolve the issue in favor of the plaintiff in
the present case.
POINT II
APPELLANT'S RECOVERY IN THE PRESENT CASE IS NOT
BARRED BY LACHES, ACQUIESENCE OR EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL.
The 1956 case of Larsen v. Larsenf 5 Utah 2d 224, 300 P.2d
596 (Utah 1956), raises the issue of whether Utah courts will
recognize laches, acquiesence or equitable estoppel as a means
of denying judgment for unpaid child support.
an allegation
parent

refused

represented

by
to

a non-custodial
accept

parent

Larsen involved

that

support payments

and

the

custodial

affirmatively

to him that she had remarried and that her new

husband was supporting the child and that "all she wanted from
13

the defendant is that he should refrain from trying to see her
or the child."

Id. at 596.

The non-custodial parent agreed to

this arrangement and further alleged that he relied on such
representations and remarried and undertook obligations which he
would not otherwise have undertaken.

On that basis, the trial

court excused the delinquent child support on the theory of
laches, acquiesence and equitable estoppel.

On appeal, the Utah

Supreme Court reversed the trial court because of inadequate
findings on the issues of laches, acquiesence or estoppel.
The Larsen court did not hold that a parent may give up
his visitation rights and thereby be relieved of his support
obligation, but it does appear to support the notion that if a
custodial parent voluntarily assumes the support obligation of a
non-custodial parent in exchange for the relinquishing by the
non-custodial
custodial

parent

parent

may

of his visitation privileges, then the
thereafter

be

barred

from

trying

to

reimpose the support obligation on the non-custodial parent.

In

the present case, there is no evidence to suggest that the
plaintiff in any way agreed to provide full support for the
minor children in exchange for defendant's abandonment of his
visitation

rights.

Similarly,

there

is

no

evidence

defendant agreed to give up his visitation rights.

that

In fact,

defendant's chief complaint is that his visitation rights had
been interfered with.

Therefore, even if Larsen were still good

law in light of Race, it would certainly not apply
present case.

14

in the

Twenty years after Larsen, the Utah Supreme Court decided
the case of Wasescha v. Wasescha, 548 P.2d 895 (Utah 1976).

In

that case, the Supreme Court of Utah affirmed the trial court's
finding that the plaintiff's action did not seek to enforce the
children's right of support and that the case was factually
similar to Larsen in that the plaintiff agreed to waive child
support if the defendant would leave her and her family alone.
Defendant agreed to do so and the trial court found that "the
father pleaded a valid contract of settlement therefor, and/or
an equitable estoppel or waiver thereof."

Id. at 895.

The

plaintiff in Wasescha was not seeking reimbursement of child
support, rather, she wanted unpaid child support to be placed in
an education trust fund for the children.

The plaintiff and her

new husband had completely taken over support of the child as
per an agreement with the defendant that he would no longer
exercise visitation rights.

In affirming the trial court, the

Supreme Court stated:
We think the facts of this case comport
favorably with the decision of the trial
court and. principles enunciated in the
whorl of debatable wisdom espoused in
Larsen v. Larsen (supra), Price v.
Price, Baas v. Anderson, and others.
Each case hangs on a spider thread of
that which the spider thinks is right to
spin. One thing certain: The right to
barter away a child's claim to support
is not a commodity in the market overt,
but if that claim has been satisfied by
one not claiming reimbursement nor by
one claiming the children were denied
the right, it is no longer subject to
double sale by double talk or flight
from equity.
15

Id,, at 896 (emphasis added).
This
considered

language

makes

it

clear

that

the

Supreme

Court

its prior decision in Larsen to be based on the

thinnest of grounds and its holding in Wasescha was that equitable estoppel or waiver would apply only where the court finds
a contractual

agreement

to release the

obligation

of child

support and where that support obligation has been adequately
assumed by another.
In
existed.

the

present

case,

no

such

contractual

arrangement

Comparing the Larsen line of cases with the case at

hand is essentially comparing apples with oranges.

Even if

Larsen applied to the facts of the present case, the principles
of Larsen would be in direct conflict with those articulated by
the Utah Supreme Court less than two years ago in Race v. Race,
and would be overruled thereby.

CONCLUSION

The case of Race v. Race is controlling in the present
circumstances, and holds that child support payments are the
right of the child and may not be contingent upon a parent's
ability to exercise visitation rights.

No matter how egregious

the actions of a custodial parent may be, the rights and welfare
of the child are paramount, and the non-custodial parent may
pursue proper remedies which do not infringe upon the child's
right to support

in order to rectify

16

a visitation dispute.

Therefore,

plaintiff-appellant

respectfully

requests

that

portion of the trial court's Order and Judgment which refused to
award judgment for the $3,520.00 in unpaid child support, be
reversed and that the trial court be ordered to enter judgment
in favor of plaintiff in that amount.
DATED this

I\

day of June, 1989.

D7 DA3«6 LAMfeE^R"^, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS tyPETERSEN
Attorneys for
Plaintiff/Appellant

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the
foregoing were mailed to the following, postage prepaid, this
&

day of June, 1989:
Richard B. Johnson
Johnson & Jackman
1327 S. 800 E. #300
Orem, UT 84085
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ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-6345

Our File No.

Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
SHARLEEN iVL McREYNOLDS
aka SHARLEEN COLTON,
ORDER AND JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. CV-87-352
GLENN L. McREYNOLDS,
Defendant.
This matter came on for hearing before the Honorable George E. Ballif on the
18th day of May, 1988.

The plaintiff was present and represented by her attorney,

Michael Petro. The defendant was present and represented by his attorney, Richard B.
Johnson.

The Court discussed with counsel the issues framed by the Pre-trial Order

and other matters desired by both sides to be brought before the Court and proceeded
to hear evidence.

The Court, having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law, now makes and enters the following:
ORDER AND JUDGMENT
1.

The Court adopts the stipulation of the parties and awards judgment in

favor of the plaintiff against the defendant in the sum of $1,120.00 for child support
accruing through July, 1986.
2.

The Court concludes that the amount to which the plaintiff would

otherwise be entitled for child support accruing from August of 1986 through the end
of May, 1988, is the sum of $3,520.00.
3.

The Court concludes that the plaintiff and her current husband have

purposefully intimidated the defendant and frustrated his attempts to visit with his
children by repeatedly changing their address and telephone numbers, forcing calls
about the children through plaintiff's present husband and a law firm answering and
forwarding facility, and have not cooperated in meeting scheduled telephone calls from
defendant and the children as ordered by Domestic Relations Commissioner, all of
which have caused defendant considerable anxiety, expenditure of time and expense
which could have been avoided by reasonable efforts on the part of the plaintiff and
her husband to afford him his visitation rights.
4.

In that regard, the Court concludes that the claims of the defendant are

substantially true as it related to his frustrated visitation with his minor children over
a period of time from July, 1986 through the present time.

The Court, therefore,

concludes that the accrued support for the period between July and the present time as
found in the sum of $3,520.00 cannot, in good conscience, be allowed the plaintiff
because of the conduct of the parties in which she has been principally responsible in
denying rights of visitation to the defendant.
5.

The Court concludes that there has been a material change of cir-

cumstances in that the children are older and that the expense of their care has
2

increased since the original Order of support was entered. Considering the income of
the respective parties as set forth in the Court's decision and the guidance of the 1987
child support schedule prepared by the Division of Recovery Services the Court
concludes that the sum of $150.00 per child (three children, two plaintiff's custody)
would be an appropriate sum for the defendant to pay for the support of his minor
children commencing June of 1988.
6.

The Court concludes that the obligation to First Security Bank on the

Visa card in the amount of $421.69 was to be paid by the defendant inasmuch as
paragraph 4 of the Davis County Judgment orders defendant to assume and pay and
hold plaintiff harmless of all debts incurred during the course of the marriage.
7.

The plaintiff and defendant shall provide coverage for medical and

health insurance through whatever source is available to them through employment.
The defendant's insurance, if any, shall be the primary carrier and the plaintiff's
insurance, if any, the secondary coverage.

In the event that here is no coverage, or

there are excess amounts of expense, each party is responsible for the one-half of the
necessary medical expenditures including dental expense.
8.

The Court concludes that the Decree and prior Orders in the case should

be amended to fix the visitation of the defendant with the minor children, The Court
concludes the Visitation Order shall be as follows:
(a)
While the defendant resides out of the State of Utah, he is
entitled to one weekend per month visitation with the children provided
he is given 30 days notice of the intent to exercise such visitation and
specifically designate the weekend which shall commence at 6:00 p.m.
Friday and terminated at 9:00 p.m. the following Sunday. This visitation
may be exercised only upon the defendant posting a certified letter to
plaintiff not less than 30 days in advance of the commencement of the
intended weekend visitation.
3

(b)
Defendant is entitled to visitation with the children for one week
during the spring school break, every other year commencing with the
year 1989. This visitation may be exercised in Utah or if desired, at
the defendant's expense, for transportation to the State of California.
(c)
Defendant is further entitled to one week of the Christmas
vacation, the first week considered to be from the first of the Christmas
holiday to 12:00 noon on Christmas Day at which time the second week
of visitation shall commence. This visitation shall begin with Christmas
of 1988 at which time defendant's visitation shall commence at noon on
Christmas Day until the day following New Year's Day. Plaintiff shall
be responsible for the travel expense of the children to defendant's
place of residence and the defendant shall be responsible for return
transportation.
(d)
Defendant shall be entitled to not less than two weeks visitation
with the children during the summer vacation, which he must designate
by certified letter to the plaintiff at least one month prior to the
commencement of the summer vacation. Defendant is responsible for
transportation to and from the residence of the children and his
residence for the summer vacation.
(e)
Any additional visitation days or additional time in the summer
may be agreed to between the parties if both subscribe to a written
documents so providing and subscribed to by each party.
(f)
Telephone visitation once a week on Sundays from 7:45 to 8:15
p.m. Utah time limited to 15 minutes duration.
(g)
All visitation periods shall be exercised in a prompt manner so
that both parties can make their plans accordingly. The non-custodial
parent shall pick the children up from the front steps of the custodial
parent's residence no earlier than 15 minutes prior and no later than 15
minutes after the visitation period commences. Return of the children
to the front steps of the custodial parent's residence shall also be
subject to the 15 minute rule. The custodial parent shall also be subject
to the 15 minute rule. The custodial parent shall have the children fed
and ready on time for visitation with sufficient clothing packed and
ready for the visitation period.
(h)
In the event the children are ill and unable to visit, a makeup
visitation will be allowed to the non-custodial parent on the next
succeeding weekend. However, if the non-custodial parent fails for any
reason not to exercise his visitation for reasons of health or for any
other reason, there will be no makeup visitation.
4

(i)
The children will not be permitted to determine whether they
wish to visit with the non-custodial parent. Personal plans of the
custodial parent or children, school activities, church activities, or other
consideration will not be reasons for failing to adhere to the visitation
scheduled set forth in the Order. Only substantial medical reasons will
be considered sufficient for postponement of visitation.
(j)
Both parties will provide addresses and contact telephone numbers
to the other party and will immediately notify the other party of any
emergency circumstances of substantial changes in the health of the
children.
(k)
The non-custodial parent shall, in addition to the visitation set
forth in this Order, have the unlimited right to correspond with the
minor children of the parties..
9.

Both parties are restrained and enjoined form making derogatory and

disparaging comments about the other party or, in any way, diminishing the love,
respect, and affection that the children have for either party.
10.

Contact for visitation arrangements are not to be made through Paul

Colton, plaintiff's husband.
11.

The Court makes no other Order on the medical or dental

needs other

than those hereinabove provided for.
12.

Each side shall bear their own costs and attorney's fees in this matter.

13.

Interest shall be awarded plaintiff on the judgment award in paragraph 1

above in the amount of $336.00, calculated according to the principles set forth in
Stroud v. Stroud. 738 P.2d 649 (Utah 1987), together with judgment interest at the rate
of twelve percent (12%) per annum from October 1, 1988.
14.

Pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-45d-l et. seq. plaintiff shall be entitled to

mandatory income withholding against defendant's income for payment of the support
order made herein in accordance with the provisions of said statute.
DATED this ZI "^dav of October, 1988.
BY THE COURT:

-Z^a

GEORG&'E. BALLfF
District Court Judge
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